Fitch: D-Cap Assessment Unchanged for U.S. Covered Bond Programs
For both programs, this is driven by the assessment of liquidity gap and systemic risk, which constitutes the weakest link among the D-Cap components. Factors considered in determining this include the relatively short maturity extension on the bonds compared to Fitch's assumption that there is a six-month liquidation timeline for U.S. mortgages and the potential 90-day stay period (three months) that could be imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) if the program sponsor were to enter receivership.
WMCBP's Liquidity Gap and Systemic Risk assessment remains at 'Full discontinuity' because the potential 90-day FDIC stay period exceeds the two-month maturity extension period on the WMCBP covered bonds. BACBI's Liquidity Gap and Systemic Risk assessment remains at 'Very high' given that the four-month maturity extension period is greater than the potential 90-day FDIC stay period but still less than Fitch's six-month liquidation timeline for U.S. mortgages.
The Asset Segregation component was assessed at 'Very low' risk for both programs mainly reflecting the fact that assets are segregated and pledged under the Uniform Commercial Code in the U.S. through the creation of a first-priority perfected security interest. The Systemic Alternative Management component of the D-cap was assessed at 'Moderate high' risk for both programs given the absence of a specific legal framework fo covered bonds in the U.S.. The Cover Pool Specific Alternative Management is assessed at 'High' and reflects the wind-down nature of the U.S. covered bond programs.
The Privileged Derivatives component for BACBI have been maintained at 'Moderate', while WMCBP's was revised from 'Very Low' to 'Moderate'. The latter reflects Fitch's reassessment of the materiality of the covered bond swaps given that the transaction has 100% FX exposure between the U.S. denominated collateral and the EUR denominated bonds.
Fitch's D-cap analysis captures the risk of payment interruption on the covered bonds upon the transition from the issuer to the cover pool as the source of covered bond payments and is expressed as a maximum number of notches that can be achieved above the Issuer Default Rating (IDR) as adjusted by the IDR uplift to the tested covered bond rating on a probability of default basis.
Комментарии