S&P downgrades ratings of National company KazMunayGaz
At the same time, we lowered the Kazakhstan national scale rating to 'kzAA-'
from 'kzAA'. The rating actions follow the downgrade of Kazakhstan on Feb. 9,
2015 (see "Kazakhstan Long-Term Ratings Lowered To 'BBB' From 'BBB+' Following
Oil Price Decline; Outlook Negative," published on RatingsDirect). The downgrade
reflects KMG's status as a government-related entity (GRE) with an "extremely
high" likelihood of receiving government support if in need. We therefore
incorporate four notches of uplift into the long-term rating.
KMG is a 100% government-owned national oil company with stakes in essentially
all of Kazakhstan's oil-related assets and priority access to new assets, which
also benefit from vertical integration into pipelines. In line with our
methodology for rating GREs, we view KMG's role in the country's economy as
"critical." In our view, if KMG were to default, this would have strong negative
implications for the government of Kazakhstan and for other GREs in the
country. KMG holds stakes in all significant oil operations in Kazakhstan. It
is one of the country's largest exporters and taxpayers and has some social
mandates such as supplying the local market with fuel at fairly low prices and
investing in socially important projects. Still, KMG is responsible for only
about 28% of the country's oil production (12% if only majority-owned
operations are included).
We view KMG's link to the Kazakhstan government as "very strong" because the
government and political support have helped KMG obtain attractive financing
terms for its investments in the past, including refinery upgrade projects and a
number of acquisitions. The government's large liquidity reserves and low debt
underpin its ability to support KMG. At the same time, KMG's strong links with
the government put pressure on its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) because
most of its capital expenditure and acquisitions reflect its role as a national
champion in the oil and gas sector, but were financed with company-level debt.
Most of KMG's majority-owned oil production assets are mature and lack growth
prospects, its refineries are relatively old, and the company only has minority
stakes in the country's most profitable and young oil projects (such as 20% in
Tengiz Chevroil and 10% in Karachaganak). At the same time, KMG's debt is
relatively large compared with the size of Kazakhstan's economy. This puts
further pressure on the company's credit profile.
The negative outlook on KMG mirrors the outlook on Kazakhstan. If we were to
lower our rating on Kazakhstan, we expect to lower the rating on KMG. This is
because of the uplift we include in the long-term rating on KMG to reflect our
expectation of an "extremely high" likelihood of government support for the
company.
The rating on KMG has a substantial margin of safety against any gradual
deterioration in the company's stand-alone performance. Pressure on the rating
could emerge only if KMG's SACP were to deteriorate to 'ccc+', such as in the
event of extremely tight liquidity. However, this is not our base-case scenario.
We would likely revise our outlook on KMG to stable following a similar outlook
revision the sovereign rating.
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